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CREATING AND MANAGING A HIGH PERFORMANCE
KNOWLEDGE-SHARING NETWORK: THE TOYOTA CASE
Abstract
This study offers a detailed case study of how Toyota facilitates interorganizational knowledge transfers
among within its production network. In particular, we identi~ and examine six key institutionalized
knowledge sharing routines developed by Toyota and its suppliers. By examining how Toyota facilitates
knowledge-sharing with, and among, suppliers we are able to identib the key variables which influence
interorganizational and network learning. Moreover, since Toyota is early in the process of creating a
learning network with U.S. suppliers, we explore the creation and evolution of Toyota’s new learning
“network” in the United States. We attempt to extrapolate from Toyota’s experience by developing a
series of propositions regarding creating and designing a high performance knowledge-sharing network.
We believe our analysis provides at least a partial explanation for why Toyota has been able to maintain
its productivity and quality advantages long after the principles of the Toyota Production System have
diffised throughout the industry (Knowledge Sharing, Interorganizational Learning, Competitive
Advantage).

The ideas behind the Toyota Production System have basically diffused and are understood by
our competitors. But the know-how regarding how to implement it in specific factories and
contexts has not. I believe that Toyota Group companies are better at implementing the ongoing
kaizen activities associated with the Toyota Production system.
Michio Tanaka, Director of International Purchasing, Toyota Corp., June 10, 1996
Recently both executives and academics have identified organizational learning as perhaps the
key factor in achieving sustainable competitive advantage. As De Geus ( 1988) argues, “The ability to
learn faster than your competitors may be the only sustainable competitive advantage.” The academic
literature on organizational learning as a source of competitive advantage is also expanding in
unprecedented fashion (Cohen & Levinthal, 1990; Teece et al, 1997; Kogut & Zander, 1992; Spender,
1996; Grant, 1996). For example, Teece et al (1997) have proposed a “dynamic capabilities” approach to
firm-level advantage suggesting that a firm’s ability to continually learn, adapt, and upgrade its
capabilities is key to competitive success. Other scholars have recently argued for a “knowledge-based
view of the firm” suggesting that the key role of the firm is in creating, storing, and applying knowledge
(Kogut & Zander, 1992; Conner& Prahalad, 1996; Grant, 1996) rather than simply reducing transaction
costs (Cease, 193 7; Williamson, 1985).
Although the focus of much of the organizational learning literature is on the individual firm as
the unit of analysis, there is increasing evidence which suggests that a “network” of firms maybe a
critical, but less understood, unit of analysis for understanding firm-level learning (Powell et al, 1996;
Dyer & Singh, 1996). Various scholars have recognized that interorganizational learning is critical to
competitive success, noting that organizations learn by collaborating with other organizations as well as
by observing and importing the practices of other organizations (March& Simon, 1958:188; Powell et
al, 1996; Levinson & Asahi, 1996). This observation is supported by research on the sources of
organizational innovation and knowledge (Mueller, 1962; Von Hippel, 1988; Nishiguchi, 1994). For
example, Von Hippel (1988) found that a firm’s customers and suppliers were its primary sources of
innovative ideas. Von Hippel argues that a production network with superior knowledge-transfer
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mechanisms among users, suppliers, and manufacturers, will be able to ‘out innovate’ production
networks with less effective knowledge sharing routines.
In a similar vein, Powell et al (1996) found that in the biotechnology industry the locus of
innovation was the network, not the individual firm. Patents were typically filed by a large number of
individuals working for a number of different organizations, including biotech firms, pharmaceutical
companies, and universities. Powell et al (1996) argue that biotech firms who are unable to create (or
position themselves in) “learning networks” are at a competitive disadvantage. Although Powell et al
(1996) make the case for the “network” as the appropriate unit of analysis for learning and innovation in
biotechnology, they do not address the specific routines involved in the interorganizational learning
process.
In fact, although there has been considerable theoretical discussion on the topic of organizational
and network learning (Spender, 1996; Levinson & Asahi, 1996; Grant, 1996), there is little empirical
research to date. As Grant (1996:384) recently observed, “detailed study of the operation of
organizational [learning] routines is limited. Further progress is critically dependent upon closer
observation of the processes through which tacit knowledge is transferred.” How exactly are learning
networks created? What are the structures and processes that allow for effective interorganizational
learning within a network? How do firms in a knowledge-sharing network solve problems inherent in
knowledge sharing, such as free rider problems and preventing undesirable spillovers? To answer these
questions, it is important to empirically examine those networks which have demonstrated a particular
ability at inter-firm knowledge transfers.
The automotive industry offers an interesting opportunity to empirically examine
interorganizational learning. Automobiles are developed and manufactured by OEMS and their network
of suppliers who often produce as much as 70 percent of the value of a vehicle. Consequently, the cost
and quality of a vehicle is a function of the productivity of a network of firms working in collaboration.
Research to date suggests that Japanese automotive networks, and Toyota’s in particular, have been
superior at transferring productivity-enhancing knowledge throughout the network (Nishiguchi, 1994;
Lieberman, 1994). For example, a study by Lieberman ( 1994) examined the diftision of lean production
practices as measured by labor productivity improvements and inventory reductions by automakers and
their suppliers from 1965-1990. Lieberman found that in Japan, labor productivity (as measured by
value added per employee) increased steadily and consistently for both automakers and suppliers
throughout the time period (See Figure 1). In contrast, the productivity of U.S. automakers and suppliers
was stagnant until the mid 1980s when U.S. automaker productivity began to increase. These
productivity increases began during a time period when Japanese automakers began establishing
transplants in the U.S. (U.S. figures include transplants) and when U.S. automakers were seriously
attempt ing to imitate “lean” production practices by benchmarking “transplant” operations. However,
these productivity improvements did not spillover to U.S. suppliers whose productivity remained
stagnant until roughly 1990.1 Why is this the case?
We submit that part of the answer has to do with the fact that Japanese automakers (especially
Toyota) have developed bilateral and multi-lateral knowledge sharing routines with suppliers that result
in superior interorganizational or network learning. Toyota, in particular, is widely recognized by both
Japanese and U.S. firms as a leader in continuous learning and improvement. There area number of
reasons to examine Toyota’s practices in greater detail. First, Toyota is the largest Japanese company
and is regularly voted by Japanese executives as the best managed and the most respected Japanese
company. Second, the most rapid diffusion of lean production techniques (e.g., kanban, inventory
reduction) has occurred within Toyota and its suppliers (Lieberman, 1994). Moreover, Lieberman et al
(1997) found a significant positive correlation between membership in Toyota’s supplier association and
supplier productivity. In summary, Toyota’s “network” appears to be highly effective at facilitating
1Sako (1997) replicated Lieberman’s study in the United Kingdom with virtually identical results.
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inter-firm knowledge transfers and may be a model for the future.
This paper has two primary objectives. The first objective is to examine in detail the
institutionalized knowledge sharing routines developed by Toyota and its suppliers. By examining how
Toyota facilitates knowledge-sharing with, and among, suppliers we are able to identify the key variables
which influence interorganizational and network learning. Moreover, since Toyota is early in the process
of creating a learning network with U.S. suppliers, we have the opportunity to examine how a firm
undertakes the task of creating a new learning “network.” The second objective is to examine how
Toyota has attempted to solve the dilemmas associated with knowledge transfers (e.g., free rider
problems). We attempt to extrapolate from Toyota’s experience to develop a a series of propositions
regarding creating and designing a high performance knowledge-sharing network.
THEORETICAL BACKGROUND
Research on organizational learning suggests that organizations that are effective at “learning”
have developed routines that allow the firm to effectively develop, store, assimilate, and apply new
knowledge on a systematic basis (Nelson& Winter, 1982; Levitt& March, 1988; Cohen& Levinthal,
1990; Nonaka, 1994). Nelson and Winter ( 1982) were among the first to argue that organizational
“routines” are the essence of the firm and that organizational learning would be expected to occur when
firms develop “adaptation routines” which allow the organization to continually modi~ existing routines
based upon new knowledge. Other scholars have also viewed organizational learning as “routine based
and history dependent” (Levitt & March, 1988: 319). Following Grant ( 1996) we define a learning
routine as regular pattern of interactions among individuals which permits the transfer, recombination, or
creation of specialized knowledge. Of course, organizational learning may also be haphazard in the
sense that knowledge is not generated by routines but rather is based on “luck” or haphazard events. In
this study we are interested in studying “routine-based” learning rather than “haphazard” learning. In
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other words, our objective is to examine learning that is facilitated through interorganizational routines
that are purposefidly designed tofacilitate knowledge transfers throughout the network.
We are primarily interested in the network as the unit of analysis rather than the individual firm
(although these two levels of analysis are clearly related). Consequently, the routines of interest are
those collectively developed within Toyota’s production network which facilitate knowledge transfers
among members. Since our focal interest is knowledge sharing within a network of firms, it is useful to
define what we mean by knowledge. Most scholars divide knowledge into two types: (1) explicit
knowledge or information, and (2) tacit knowledge or know-how (Kogut and Zander, 1992; Grant, 1996;
Ryle, 1984). Information is defined as easily modifiable knowledge that can
of integrity once the syntactical rules required for deciphering it are known.
be transmitted “without loss
Information includes facts,
axiomatic propositions, and symbols” (Kogut & Zander, 1992:386). By comparison, know-how involves
knowledge that is tacit, “sticky,” complex, and difficult to codi~ (Nelson & Winter, 1982; Kogut &
Zander, 1992; Szulanski, 1996).2
Information sharing within a network can be accomplished through “weak ties.” Thus, the
breadth or size of the network is likely to influence the amount of diverse information available to
members and thus will be important for generating value to individual members. However, know-how
sticky, tacit, and difficult-to-codify and thus is difficult to transfer. Thus, it requires “thick” or dense
ties with other members of the network. Consequently, a smaller network may have some advantages
is
relative to a larger network. The properties of know-how suggest that, compared to information, know-
how is more likely to result in advantages that are sustainable. As a result, production networks that are
particularly effective at transferring know-how are likely to outperform competing networks.
2 Spender (1996) separates tacit knowledge into three types: ( 1) conscious knowledge, or knowledge
that can be codified to some extent and is potentially available to others, (2) automatic knowledge, which
is taken-for-granted implicit knowledge that happens by itself, and (3) collective knowledge, or
knowledge of a social or communal nature.
5
Previous research suggests that the effective transfer of know-how requires: (1) absorptive
capacity (ability to assimilate the transfer) on the part of the receiving firm (Cohen & Levinthal, 1990;
Von Hippel, 1988; Szulanski, 1996), (2) the appropriate processes to make the transfer happen; for
know-how sharing the processes involve long term, dense (thick) network ties developed through
repeated social (socio-technical) interactions (Von Hippel, 1988; Marsden, 1990; Kogut & Zander, 1992)
and (3) incentives for knowledge sharing (transferring firm) and knowledge acquisition (receiving
firm) [Szulanski, 1996]. These challenges are significant in a network setting because the creation of
knowledge sharing routines among members poses two key dilemmas: (1) preventing “free riders,”3 and
(2) preventing undesirable knowledge spillovers. Firms that have developed proprietary knowledge that
they believe provides their firm a competitive advantage in the marketplace will be especially reluctant
to participate in knowledge-sharing activities. Thus, a key challenge for a knowledge sharing network is
providing assurances to members that proprietary knowledge will be protected while at the same time
encouraging members to contribute valuable knowledge to the collective good. There is an important
tradeoff here: network members may be so concerned about protecting proprietary knowledge that they
devise rules or engage in behavior such that little or no valuable knowledge is contributed to the network.
However, the knowledge that is likely to be most valuable to other firms in the production network is
often exactly the kind of knowledge that individual firms want to keep proprietary because it is valuable.
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
In our exploratory study the “ production network” consisted of the group of firms which
3 The free rider problem is often discussed in collective action theories which examine the challenges
associated with achieving collaboration toward common goals among self interested individuals, groups,
or organizations (Rolphs, 1974; Sandier, 1992; MarWell & Oliver, 1993). Successful collaboration may
produce “collective” or “public” goods (e.g., knowledge) that are accessible to all members of the
network (impossibility of exclusion). However, the creation of routines for knowledge sharing within a
network has the potential for “free riders,” members who enjoy the benefits of the collective good
without contributing to its establishment and/or maintenance.
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collaborate to develop and manufacture a motor vehicle. The automaker, Toyota, is the “central” or core
firm in the network because: (1) Toyota is the only firm with direct ties to every other firm in the
network, and (2) Toyota coordinates the activities of all firms in the network. As the central firm,
Toyota also has the most to gain from developing learning routines that increase the efficiency of the
entire value chain or production network.
The primary objective of this exploratory study was to identi~ an examine the institutionalized
routines developed by Toyota designed to facilitate knowledge sharing among Toyota and its network of
first tier suppliers. Consequently, it was necessary to identifi the organizational units (divisions) within
Toyota which interact with suppliers and are involved in “supplier development” activities. This was
done by interviewing Toyota’s purchasing general managers in both Japan and the United States. These
senior purchasing executives identified the various Toyota divisions which had significant interactions
with suppliers. These divisions included: (1) Purchasing Division, (2) Operations Management
Consulting Division (OMCD), (3) Quality Assurance Division (QAD), (4) Logistics Administration
Division (LAD), (5) Manufacturing Operations Division (MOD), and (6) Design Engineering Division
(DED). Executives from each of these divisions were interviewed to identify the formalized routines
designed to facilitate knowledge sharing with, and among, suppliers. Using a snowball sampling
technique, our research team interviewed a total of 30 Toyota executives totaling more than 100 hours in
interviews. To veri$ the knowledge sharing activities identified by Toyota, as well as explore the
supplier-to-supplier routines not identified by Toyota, we also interviewed senior executives at 10 of
Toyota’s first tier suppliers in Japan and 11 Toyota suppliers in the U.S. (See Table 1 for a list of Toyota
executives and suppliers interviewed).
As we conducted interviews with both Toyota and supplier executives, we focused our attention
on identi~ing and understanding the bilateral and multi-lateral knowledge transfer “routines” among
Toyota and its suppliers. We also explored the challenges associated with the creation and maintenance
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of those routines.
INSTITUTIONALIZED KNOWLEDGE-SHARING ROUTINES
Toyota has developed a wide range of organizational routines to enhance “supplier development”
and inter-firm learning. Purchasing takes the lead role in coordinating supplier development activities
(followed by OMCD), but all of the previously mentioned divisions have specific “supplier development”
responsibilities. When necessary, these different functions work together to solve problems with suppliers.
Through our interviews we identified six key institutionalized processes/routines which facilitate inter-firm
knowledge sharing within the production network (See Table 2).
1. Supplier Association
Toyota’s supplier association (kyohokai) in Japan was established in 1943 to promote “mutual
friendship” and the “exchange of technical information” between Toyota and its parts suppliers. In 1996
Toyota’s ~ohokai had three stated “purposes”: (1) information exchange between member companies and
Toyota, (2) mutual development and training among member companies, and (3) socializing events
(Internal Toyota Document, 1996). To achieve these purposes, Toyota’s kyohokai is divided into three
regions, Tokai @ohokai (150 members) for the Tokai region (aichi prefecture where Toyota City resides),
Kanto ~ohokai (65 members) for the Tokyo region, and Kansai @ohokai (29 members). Toyota has
created three separate regional associations because it recognizes that for the supplier associations to
achieve their objectives, the suppliers must be in close geographic proximity (e.g., within 3-4 hours by car
or train), Toyota also established an equipment supplier association (eihoukui) in 1983 which currently has
77 members and is designed to achieve the same purposes as the kyohokai.
Toyota started its U.S. supplier association (Bluegrass Automotive Manufacturers Association, or
BAMA) in 1989 with only 13 suppliers. Involvement was voluntary and most of the initial members were
U.S. suppliers and Japanese transplants located in close proximity to the Georgetown, Kentucky plant.
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The initial objective was to provide a monthly forum for sharing information with suppliers and for
eliciting supplier feedback. Even though few suppliers joined, Toyota proceeded and attempted to make
BAMA meetings as valuable as possible for suppliers. Gradually, the word spread through the supply base
that these meetings were useful. By 1997 the association had grown to 97 suppliers. States Toyota’s Chris
Nielsen, assistant general manager for purchasing planning,
We really didn’t know if this would work in the U.S. Getting suppliers to talk to each other was a
key element of the program. Before BAMA, it was not very natural for supplier executives to talk
and share information. It was uncomfortable. Over the years that has changed significantly as
suppliers have built relationships at senior levels (Interview, November 17, 1997).
This message is echoed by the plant manager of a Toyota supplier.
Before BAMA, we really didn’t know or share information with executives at other suppliers. And
we just didn’t think about calling them up or visiting. It just didn’t happen. BAMA has helped us
to get to know each other and now it feels a lot more comfortable calling up another supplier for
information or even visiting their plants (Interview, November 18, 1997).
The organization of Toyota’s kyohokai is outlined in Figure 2. The general assembly, top
management meetings, and executive meetings are designed to allow for high-level communication within
the network with regard to production plans, policies, market trends, etc. Thus, these meetings primarily
facilitate information sharing among members. More frequent interaction occurs within the divisional
committees and topic committees (cost, quality, safety, etc.) where members engage in both information
and know-how sharing. Divisional committees are comprised of suppliers who join the meetings because
of the nature of the parts they produce or the production processes they employ. For example, division
committee 2 is comprised of suppliers who primarily supply parts to the powertrain (engine, transmission,
etc). of Toyota vehicles. This allows Toyota and its members to share knowledge with others that are
making parts which interface with each other. It also facilitates knowledge sharing among members using
similar production processes. This method of grouping suppliers ensures that the information and know-
how shared is relevant to the supplier member.
The topic committees on cost, quality, safety, and general affairs are designed to facilitate
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knowledge sharing on topics that are critical to all members in the network.4 The PR-Sports committee
(which primarily sets up golf events and baseball activities) is designed to facilitate social interaction
among members. To illustrate the role that the topic committees play in facilitating network learning, we
examine the quality committee activities in greater detail.
The quality committee, established in 1961, engages in a number of activities designed to improve
the quality capabilities of members of the network. The “regular committee” picks a theme for the year
(e.g., the 1994 theme was “Eliminating supplier design defects”) and meets six times each year to share
knowledge with regard to that particular theme. These themes are selected by suppliers (with Toyota’s
input) in areas believed to be important and relevant to a large number of members in the network. In
addition to the “regular committee” meetings, the quality committee also sponsors “basic quality training,”
“excellent plant tours,” and an annual “quality management conference. ” The basic training course offers
quality training to approximately 100 engineers each year. The 5 session, 12 day course takes 96 hours to
complete. This training provides a basic, common knowledge base (builds absorptive capacity) among
network members which allows them to more efficiently transfer more complex quality knowledge through
plant tours, conferences, etc.
The excellent plant tours allow network members to visit “best practice” plants both inside and
outside the automotive industry so that members can see the processes used by firms which achieve high
quality. The quality management conference is held once each year and offers Toyota suppliers the
opportunity to learn from lectures delivered by experienced Toyota directors and senior managers, as well
as six successful supplier cases of quality improvement: 2 managers’ cases, 2 foremens’ cases, and 2 quality
circles’ cases. The six supplier cases are selected from case write-ups submitted to a committee panel by
d The general affairs committee focuses on activities of current interest to a broad set of members.
For example, during 1994 (a recession year) the committee’s “theme” was improving the productivity of
white collar workers. This is of particular importance during a recession because Japanese firms cannot
easily lay off white collar workers.
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member companies. [n 1994, 146 out of 150 Tokai Kyohokai members (98°/0) submitted cases to the
conference.
In summary, the supplier association’s primary objective is to develop ties among members and
transfer explicit knowledge through multi-lateral knowledge transfers. The subcommittees are designed to
facilitate the transfer of both explicit and tacit knowledge.
2. Operations Management Consulting Division
The Operations Management Consulting Division (OMCD) was established in the mid 1960s by
Taiichi Ohno. The purpose of OMCD is to maintain a group of internal consultants with high levels of
expertise in operations to assist in solving operational problems both at Toyota and at Toyota’s suppliers.
These individuals are assigned the task of assisting plants achieve productivity improvements, inventory
reductions, and quality improvements. OMCD currently consists of six senior and highly experienced
executives (each with responsibility for two Toyota plants and approximately 10 suppliers) and about fifly
consultants. Approximately 15-20 consultants are permanent members of OMCD while the rest are
younger individuals who are expected to deepen their knowledge of the Toyota Production System (TPS)
and enhance their experience through a rotation (usually 3 years) at OMCD. In many respects, these senior
executives and consultants are the experts of TPS. OMCD facilitates knowledge sharing by providing
direct assistance to suppliers, who must request OMCD’S assistance (usually through the purchasing
division). This typically involves sending a team of consultants to the supplier for a period of time ranging
from 1 day to many months, depending on the nature of the problem. This assistance is “free” to suppliers
who are not charged for the consultants time. Our 1992 survey of 38 first tier Toyota suppliers revealed
that all suppliers in our sample had, at one time or another, been visited by Toyota personnel who assisted
in improving the suppliers’ operations. On average, suppliers reported receiving 4.2 visits per year (during
the past three years) and these visits lasted an average of 3.1 days.
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The U.S. version of OMCD is called the Toyota Supplier Support Center (TSSC). TSSC was
established in 1992 with the objective of “assisting North American suppliers to implement their own
version of TPS” (Internal Toyota document, 1995). TSSC’S general manager, Haj ime Ohba, was formed y
a member of OMCD in Japan. TSSC began in 1992 with only one consultant, Mr. Ohba, but the consulting
staff grew to 14 by 1994, and 20 by 1996. The real know-how sharing occurs in the consultation projects
with suppliers on the plant floor. Since 1992 TSSC has received approximately 100 requests for assistance
and has entered into 53 consultation projects. Toyota does not charge fees for its assistance but does
demand that participating suppliers be willing to let Toyota bring other companies to see their operations
when the project is completed. States TSSC consultant Less Nichols, “That’s one of our requirements
because if we take the time and effort to transfer the know-how, we need to be able to use the suppliers’
operations as a vehicle to help other suppliers.” This allows Toyota to: (1) develop some “showcase
suppliers” that have successfully implemented the TPS; this provides a valuable learning laboratory for
other suppliers attempting to improve their operations, and (2) start the process of getting suppliers
their operations to one another.5 Suppliers are selected based upon several factors, including: their
enthusiasm for improvement, the involvement of top management, and the potential for successful
to open
completion within six months. To date, Toyota has found that know-how transfers with regard to TPS are
extremely difficult and time consuming. Although the goal is to achieve success in 6 months, no project
has been completed in less than 8 months and most last at least 18 months. States Mr. Ohba, “It takes a
very long time and tremendous commitment to implement the Toyota Production System. In many cases it
takes a total cultural and organizational change. Many U.S. firms have management systems that
contradict where you need to go.” Consequently, some of TSSC’S consulting projects can be quite time
and resource intensive. One of the first U.S. suppliers to use TSSC was Summit Polymers, a manufacturer
5 Suppliers can designate certain other areas of their plants (where Toyota has not provided assistance)
as off-limits to visits in order to protect proprietary knowledge.
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of plastic interior parts. According to Tom Luyster, Summit’s Vice President of Planning, TSSC sent
approximately 4-6 consultants eve~ day for a period of 3-4 months as Summit Polymers attempted to
implement TPS concepts in a new plant. [n their case, ongoing support has continued for over 3 years.
By November of 1996, TSSC had “completed” 31 projects with suppliers with impressive results.
On average, TSSC had assisted suppliers in achieving an average inventory reduction of 75 percent and an
average increase in productivity or output per worker of 124 percent (See Figure 3). These data provide
evidence that TSSC’s process of knowledge transfer and assistance substantially improves performance.
It is worth noting that Toyota does not ask for immediate price decreases or a portion of the savings from
the improvements. However, suppliers claim that they often pass on some of the savings due to a feeling
of obligation.
3. Voluntary Learning Teams (Jishuken)
OMCD facilitates knowledge sharing across suppliers in a way that is quite unique within the
automotive industry (and perhaps within any industry). In 1977 OMCD organized a group of roughly 55-
60 of its key suppliers (providing over 80 percent of its parts in value) into “voluntary study groups”
(Jishuken@Aai or jishuken) for the purpose of assisting each other with productivity and quality
improvements. Each supplier group consists of roughly 5-7 suppliers, many of whom use similar
production processes (e.g., stamping, welding, painting, etc.). Body suppliers are placed in one of two
groups (Group I, II) and parts suppliers are placed in one of seven groups, (Groups A-G; See Figure 4).
Toyota groups suppliers together based upon: (1) geographic proximity, (2) competition (direct
competitors are not in the same group), and (3) experience with Toyota (each group has at least one
affiliated Toyota supplier such as Denso or Aisin Seiki; these suppliers may be expected to take a
leadership role). Groups are usually reorganized every three years by Toyota in order to put some stimulus
into the activity and maintain diversity of ideas.c Each year the suppliers meet together with the
responsible OMCD manager and consultants to detenn ine a “theme” (project) for the year. The basic idea
is to help each other increase productivity in areas of common interest, such as reducing lead times or
inventories. Supplier executives that participate injishuken activities are typically plant managers,
assistant plant managers, and/or section managers (each member company usually has 5-8 people taking
part in the activity).
Atler a theme is decided, the group then sets a schedule to rotate from one supplier plant to the
next to examine the processes in question and to jointly develop suggestions for improvement. The group
will go through four “phases” with regard to each project and will focus on one supplier plant for a period
of four months. The phases are as follows: ( 1) preliminary inspection, (2) diagnosis and experimentation,
(3) presentation, (4) follow-up/evaluation. During the first two months the processes being examined are
videotaped and executives from the other suppliers visit as needed in order to examine the process and
offer suggestions for improvement, much like consultants. A member of OMCD also visits frequently (i.e.
every week or two) to give advice and monitor progress. This allows Toyota to bring its expertise to bear
in helping solve supplier problems. It also allows Toyota to “learn” what is being learned by suppliers.
This adds to Toyota’s stock of knowledge and allows OMCD to keep abreast of new ideas and applications
of the Toyota Production System. This is valuable to both Toyota and the network because OMCD can
transfer this knowledge to Toyota’s internal operations or to other suppliers. At the end of the year Toyota
organizes a meeting (conference) where all of thejishuken groups meet together to share the key
knowledge acquired from the year’s activities. This allows suppliers to learn what issues are being
addressed in other groups. This is useful for two primary reasons. First, suppliers otlen acquire valuable
information from the presentations, including ideas for the next year’sjishuken project. Second, and more
b However, Toyota last reorganized itsjishuken groups in 1992 so the current groups have been
together for 5 years.
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importantly, suppliers obtain information on which other suppliers are working on projects that may offer
valuable knowledge. This information is useful because supplier executives can follow-up informally in
making contacts to learn from those suppliers with relevant expertise.
In 1994 Toyota established its Plant Development Activity (PDA) Core Groups which was an
attempt to replicate thejishuken concept in the United States. Three groups were formed with 11 suppliers
placed in each group. 7 As with the supplier association, involvement was voluntary and suppliers that were
chosen for involvement were members of BAMA. The theme for the first year was “quality improvement”
because, as Nielsen noted, “everyone agrees that they can improve quality.” Each TPS core group member
was asked to select a “demonstration line” within a plant as a place to experiment when implementing the
concepts. A schedule was developed to meet each month at a supplier plant at which Toyota personnel
from the technical support group would attempt to demonstrate some key concepts at the demonstration
line, and the group members would discuss ways to improve the line. The group would visit the same
supplier for three months and then rotate to a new supplier.
The first year was successful enough that other suppliers requested the opportunity to join a PDA
core group. So Toyota added 15 suppliers and another PDA core group in 1995 (roughly 12 suppliers per
group). However, some of the groups were experiencing difficulties because of markedly different skills
and knowledge of TPS methods among suppliers. Stated Toyota technical support specialist Tom
Fitzgibbons, “We tried high skill and low skill suppliers together but sometimes it didn’t work well because
we had to keep stopping to explain basic concepts to the new suppliers. ” Consequently, Toyota
reorganized the groups in 1996 into four groups where “skill level” was also considered. The “orange”
group included suppliers with strong TPS skills, the “blue” and “green” groups with mid-level skills, and
7Toyota indicated that they considered two factors in placing suppliers into groups: ( 1) no direct
competitors in the same group, (2) geographic proximity (they try to keep members within a 3-4 hour
drive).
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the “purple” group consisted of less experienced or new members who were participating for the first time.
In order to be considered for participation in a PDA core group the supplier must be a member of
BAMA for at least one year. Toyota claims that this requirement is necessary to assure assimilation into
BAMA, top management commitment, and familiarity with the basic concepts of TPS (e.g., develop the
requisite absorptive capacity within the supplier). US. plant managers report that they believe the PDA
core group activities have been extremely valuable. Stated one plant manager,
We get blinded just like everyone else. When you bring a whole new set of eyes into your plant
you learn a lot. You feel like you are getting beat up for the first few hours. We’ve made quite a
few improvements. In fact, after the (PDA) core group visits to our plant, we made more than 70
changes to the manufacturing cell.
In fact, all 10 U.S. suppliers we interviewed claimed that the PDA core group activities are more valuable
to suppliers than BAMA. As one plant manager stated,
I think BAMA is extremely valuable. But the TPS core group activities are even more valuable to
us than BAMA. If I had to choose, I would definitely choose to be involved in the core groups
rather than BAMA. We learn more that is useful in our daily operations.
A key reason that the PDA core group activities are particularly effective at knowledge transfers is that
they involve learning that is “hands on” and “on site.” Furthermore, as one plant manager noted, “We find
more things that are useful visiting other suppliers’ plants versus Toyota’s plants; even simple things like
how to best start our equipment. Suppliers’ operations are more similar to ours.”
4. Problem Solving Teams
Jishuken teams are processes designed to systematically transfer knowledge that resides within
network members to other members. However, in addition tojishuken, Toyota has a process of forming
problem solving teams designed to bring knowledge to bear in solving emergent problems within the
network. For example, in some cases a supplier may be experiencing a quality problem where the root
cause is not easily determined. In this case, Toyota’s Quality Assurance Division (QAD) will set up a
problem solving team (which includes various Toyota divisions and may even involve other Toyota
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suppliers) to collectively bring their knowledge to bear to “fix” the quality problems. When established,
the team defines the cause(s) of the supplier’s quality problems and hands over the problem solving
process to an appropriate division(s) within Toyota. For example, once the problem-solving team has
defined the root of the supplier’s quality problem as being in the product design, Toyota’s Design
Engineering Division, which has already been involved in the problem-solving team, will be asked to take
the lead in working more closely with the supplier to implement solutions to improve quality. In some
cases, Toyota may determine that the relevant knowledge resides within a competitor of the supplier. In
this case, Toyota will attempt to orchestrate a supplier-to-supplier knowledge transfer.. Toyota has long
maintained a two vendor policy and typically procures the same types of parts from two suppliers. When
the quality of one supplier is significantly inferior to the other’s, QAD may transfer information regarding
quality processes from the better supplier to the inferior supplier based upon a negotiated agreement with
both suppliers. In some rare cases, QAD will coordinate a visit by the inferior supplier to the superior
supplier’s plant .8 According to Toyota executives, upgrading the skills of the inferior supplier not only
improves the quality of the weaker supplier but also stimulates long term competition (see Dyer& Ouchi,
1993).
5. Interfirm Employee Transfers
The practice of interfkn employee transfers (shukko) in Japan is by now well known (Cusumano,
1985; Lincoln et al, 1992; Gerlach, 1992; Dyer& Ouchi, 1993), though less is known about how many
individuals are transferred or the exact reasons for employee transfers. Some previous studies suggest that
important reasons for shukko include helping large assemblers maintain control of suppliers and the
opportunity to shed unwanted employees (Lincoln et al, 1992; Gerlach, 1992). However, our interviews
* We did not find this type of supplier-to-supplier knowledge sharing in the U.S. However, 8 of 10
U.S. suppliers we interviewed reported that Toyota orchestrated a trip to Japan during which they visited
supplier plants, in some cases Japanese suppliers in the same business.
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suggest that, at least in Toyota’s case, shukko is also an important mechanism for transferring knowledge
to suppliers. In a survey of 48 of Toyota’s largest suppliers, we found that 11 percent of the suppliers’
directors (yzkuin) were former employees (the figure was 23 percent for Toyota’s “affiliated” suppliers or
suppliers in which Toyota owned some stock). Overall, Toyota transfers approximately 120-130
individuals per year to other firms in the value chain, most of whom go to suppliers (Interview, June 10,
1997). Some of these transfers are permanent in nature (usually at the director level) but others are
temporary. For example, when we visited Kojima Press, a supplier of spoilers and other body parts, we
found that the assistant plant manager was a Toyota engineer on leave from Toyota for a 2-3 year
assignment. The purpose of the assignment was to bring his Toyota training and knowledge to bear in
helping the supplier while learning about the problems that suppliers experience. At another supplier, we
interviewed a “transferee” who had been sent to the supplier to help it set up operations and accounting
systems in the U.S. and Mexico. This particular individual had worked in the automaker’s U.S. operations
and therefore had a knowledge of U.S. and Mexican accounting systems which he was able to transfer to
the supplier. In many cases the supplier may have a need for particular skills or knowledge which
members of its workforce do not possess. Consequently, it will make a request to the automaker (usually
through purchasing to the personnel department) for someone with particular skills. The automaker will
search within its organization and then offer someone to the supplier organization. Suppliers claimed that
they had the right to refuse the person offered. However, given Toyota’s importance as a customer, it is
questionable as to whether this “right” is ever exercised. Regardless, these transfers are an important
routine which fulfills a knowledge-transfer function. To date, these transfers only occur with Japanese
suppliers in Japan.
6. Performance Feedback and Monitoring Processes
Finally, by providing frequent performance feedback to suppliers and by monitoring whether or
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not suppliers implement new knowledge/technology, Toyota pushes suppliers to learn and implement new
knowledge. In particular, Toyota has developed numerous means for giving feedback to suppliers on their
performance and encouraging them to implement new practices to improve their productivity and quality.
For example, Toyota systematically offers feedback to suppliers on their performance in a number of areas,
including management, production, quality, research, etc. Wada (1991) claims that by providing feedback
to suppliers on their performance, suppliers feel motivated to search for new technologies and methods to
improve.
“Without naming names the [performance] Summary...enabled each supplier to see quite easily
where the company stood in relation to other companies in the same line of business and in relation
to all the other companies. This ranking of suppliers and its publication at an open meeting in a
form that made it easy for suppliers to compare themselves with others had the effect of
stimulating a more competitive spirit among suppliers.” (Wada, 1991:31).
In addition to the regular feedback (e.g., monthly) on performance, Toyota also provides more detailed
feedback on an adhoc basis and occasionally conducts audits to monitor whether or not suppliers are
implementing new processes. For example, QAD is in charge of quality audits for supplier plants. QAD
visits suppliers on a rotating basis to check to evaluate quality systems and processes and to ensure that
these processes maintain the company’s quality standard. The purchasing division typically identifies
which suppliers it wants QAD to visit based upon the purchasing division’s evaluation of the supplier’s
quality performance. Naturally, suppliers with a history of quality problems are more likely to be audited.
During these audits, QAD writes a “quality problem report” which analyzes whether there might be
chronic and fundamental problems in a supplier’s production system. These audits also give QAD an
opportunity to provide direct, on site instruction to suppliers in quality assurance processes. In a similar
fashion, Toyota’s “cost planning departments” within both purchasing and engineering monitor suppliers’
components costs. OMCD would be asked to assist suppliers that needed to reduce costs and improve
productivity.
After Toyota offers instruction to suppliers, Toyota documents the changes that suppliers are asked
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to make. They use this documentation later when monitoring the suppliers’ processes to ensure that
suppliers have implemented the necessary changes. To illustrate, a U.S. supplier executive described how
Toyota used this information to push his company to learn and improve.
Toyota sent in a team of consultants to offer suggestions on how we could reduce our costs to meet
the target cost. Their help was extremely valuable and we made some significant improvements.
But after considerable effort we felt we would be unable to hit the target cost. So we visited the
purchasing manager to ask for a price increase. After we made the request, the purchasing
manager pulled out a file which had a list of the actions we were to take based upon the
suggestions of their consultants. While pointing to the first item on the list, he asked, “Have you
done this yet?” Fortunately we had and we responded positively. But then he proceeded to go
through each item the list. We could only answer “yes” to about two-thirds of the items. Then he
said politely, “When you have taken action on every item on this list you won’t need a price
increase; but if you still think you do, come back and we will discuss it (Interview, September
1993).
This supplier executive explained that while Toyota is generous in offering assistance, they also expect
results. Perhaps that is why the supplier community in Japan often uses the term “Toyota Jigoku” (Toyota
Hell) to refer to working with Toyota. Working with Toyota as a supplier is not easy because Toyota is
extremely demanding and expects continuous improvement (learning). But Toyota’s efforts to assist
suppliers and to encourage them to improve have resulted in a supplier base that is the most productive in
the industry (Lieberman et al, 1997).
In summary, Toyota has created a number of complex routines designed to store and diffuse
knowledge within the network and facilitate both bilateral and multi-lateral transfers of both explicit and
tacit knowledge. As a final example of the importance Toyota places on communication with, and among
suppliers, Toyota is currently building a “Supplier Center” next to its headquarters and technical center in
Toyota City, Japan. The new five-floor building, which will be completed in 1998 to commemorate the
50’hanniversary of the K“ohokai, will have display rooms for suppliers’ products as well as meeting rooms
to be used for suppliers. The building represents not only Toyota’s commitment to working closely with
its suppliers, but also demonstrates Toyota’s appreciation of its suppliers’ contribution to Toyota’s success.
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FEATURES OF AN EFFECTIVE KNOWLEDGE-SHARING NETWORK
Our exploratory study of Toyota’s knowledge sharing network suggests that there area number of
important features that play an important role in creating and managing an effective knowledge-sharing
network.
1. Creating Organizational Units (Locations) for Accumulating Knowledge in the Network.
In order to increase the ability of the organizationhetvvork to accumulate and build on its stock
of valuable knowledge, Toyota has created a number of organizational units which are given the
responsibility for knowledge acquisition, storage, and diffusion. The most important of these is
OMCD/TSSC which has the primary responsibility for acquiring, storing, and diffusing production
know-how. However, the supplier association subcommittees (e.g., cost, quality, safety) andji.shuken
also perform important knowledge management functions. By creating organizational units that are
tasked with accumulating knowledge that resides within the network, Toyota has been able to
systematically build and add to the existing stock of knowledge within the network. Furthermore,
network members know where to find different types of knowledge so it reduces their search costs. As
one supplier executive noted, “With Toyota as a customer, 1always know where to go to get help when I
have a problem.” Thus, we offer the following proposition:
Proposition 1: The amount of interorganizational learning which takes place within a production
network increases when the network creates organizational units (locations) for
accumulating the stock of knowledge that resides within the network. (Increases the
number of individuals/unitsresponsible for knowledge acquisition, storage, and
d@sion).
2. Eliminating “Proprietary Knowledge” Within Particular Knowledge Domains
We previously suggested that a tl.mdamental dilemma for a knowledge sharing network is
providing assurances to members that proprietary knowledge will be protected while at the same time
encouraging members to contribute valuable knowledge to the collective good. Toyota solves this
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problem by simply eliminating the notion that there is “proprietary knowledge” within certain knowledge
domains (e.g., production, quality, etc.). By openly sharing all of the valuable production know-how at
its disposal, Toyota creates a norm within the network that very little of the knowledge that a firm
possesses is proprietary (with the exception of certain product designs/technology). Production
processes are simply not viewed as proprietary and Toyota accepts that some valuable knowledge will
spillover to benefit competitors,. Thus, any knowledge that is production related (cost, quality, inventory
management, etc.) is viewed as accessible to virtually any member of the network (with perhaps the
exception of a direct competitor). Toyota creates a norm of reciprocal knowledge sharing within the
production network by providing free assistance to suppliers and allowing suppliers full access to
Toyota’s operations and stock of knowledge (the only exception is the new model design area which is
available only to certain key suppliers). Suppliers must be willing to open their plants to other network
members if they choose to receive Toyota consulting assistance and/or participate injishuken/PDA core
groups. This requirement essentially eliminates the free rider problem because the price of entry is a
willingness to open up your operations for inspection. As one supplier executive stated, “They gave us a
gift [TPS]; how can we not open our plant and share what we’ve learned with other Toyota suppliers.”
Thus, Toyota’s initiatives to freely share its proprietary knowledge with other network members act as a
“starting mechanism” (see Gouldner, 1963) for reciprocal knowledge sharing of proprietary knowledge.
In turn, these norms have the effect of minimizing the amount of firm-specific knowledge within
particular knowledge domains that is considered proprietary.
Proposition 2: l%e amount of interorganizational learning which takes place within a production
network increases when the network creates normsfor knowledge sharing which
minimize the amount offirm-specl~c knowledge that is considered proprieta~ by
network members.
3. Creating Multiple Knowledge-Sharing Processes and Nested Networks in the Larger Network
Toyota has developed a variety of bilateral and multi-lateral processes to facilitate the sharing of
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different types of knowledge (both explicit and tacit) within the network. This allows for a “matching”
of the type of knowledge with the process such that the knowledge flows in the most efficient manner
possible. For example, the supplier association is a vehicle for quickly disseminating explicit knowledge
to all members of the network. By creating “nested networks” (e.g., the jishuken groups) within the full
network, individual members are able to develop embedded ties with those other members that have
particularly relevant knowledge. Further, the processes allow for multi-lateral transfers of tacit
knowledge on a particular topic/knowledge domain. OMCD and the problem solving teams engage in
bilateral tacit knowledge transfers of a particular type. Thus, there area variety of complex processes
through which members can choose to receive, or transfer, different types of knowledge. Generally
speaking, the more tacit the knowledge, the smaller the knowledge sharing group and the longer the
transfer takes.
Proposition 3: The amount of interorganizational learning which takes place within a production
network increases when thefill network creates nested networks to facilitate the sharing
of dl~erent types of knowledge.
Incentives for Knowledge Acquisition and Application
h addition to creating a norm for reciprocal knowledge-sharing among network members, as
previously described Toyota “pushes” suppliers to learn through frequent performance feedback and
monitoring processes. Ultimately, suppliers pursue the acquisition of knowledge in a self-interested
effort to increase firm-level productivity and profitability. However, the fact that Toyota constantly
keeps “score” with regard to a supplier’s success at implementing new knowledge provides constant
motivation to acquire and implement new knowledge. Furthermore, Toyota rewards those suppliers that
make exceptional knowledge-sharing contributions to the network by giving them additional business or
even paying a bonus for their contributions (See Nishiguchi, 1997).
Proposition 4: The amount of interorganizational learning which takes place within a production
network increases as measures of [earning are developed andfeedback on performance
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isfrequently shared within the network.
ln summary, Toyota is effective at creating an effective knowledge sharing network because it:(1)
creates organizational units with the explicit responsibility to accumulate, store, and diffuse relevant
knowledge within the network, (2) creates “rules” or norms for participation in the network which
essentially eliminates the free rider problem, (3) creates a range of processes and nested networks within
the full network to facilitate the effective transfer of both explicit and tacit knowledge, and (4) creates
incentives for knowledge acquisition and application.
The Creation and Evolution of Toyota’s Knowledge-Sharing Network
By examining the creation and evolution of Toyota’s network over time, we gain insights into
how firms may attempt to successfully create and manage a knowledge sharing network. In particular,
our ability to study the creation and evolution of Toyota’s relatively new U.S. supplier network offers the
opportunity to examine how the network was created as wel I as how it has evolved. Our exploratory
study of To yota suggests a number of factors have contributed to its abi Iity to create high-performance
knowledge-sharing networks in the U.S. and Japan. First, Toyota introduced three institutional
innovations which have played an important role in the creation of the network and in facilitating
interorganizational learning. These innovations were: (1) the supplier association, (2) the in-house
knowledge transfer consultants (OMCD, TSSC), and (3)jishuken or small group learning teams. In both
Japan and the United States, these institutions were introduced to suppliers in the same order (See Figure
5). Toyota first established the supplier association which facilitated the sharing of explicit knowledge
and the creation of social network ties among suppliers. This was a critical first step in getting members
of the network to talk to each other in a non-threatening setting. The supplier association was followed
by the availability of Toyota consultants who were accessible, free of charge, to transfer valuable tacit
know-how regarding TPS at the suppliers’ facilities. The Toyota consultants were the catalysts for
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creating a non-n of reciprocal knowledge sharing (of seemingly proprietary knowledge) and a feeling of
indebtedness and openness within the supplier network. Indeed, to receive assistance from Toyota
consultants the supplier had to agree to open up its plant to other Toyota suppliers. Finally, afier network
members had developed social ties and norms of reciprocal knowledge sharing with Toyota (and a
feeling of obligation to Toyota) and other Toyota suppliers, Toyota organized suppliers into small
learning teams, carefully organizing teams to maximize the willingness and ability of suppliers to learn
from each other (e.g., keeping direct competitors apart; rotating group membership to maximize diversity
of ideas, requiring a minimum level of absorptive capacity with regard to TPS, etc.). By doing so,
Toyota created a set of “nested networks” within the full network. These nested networks were designed
to facilitate the sharing of tacit knowledge among members and reduced the importance of Toyota’s role
in the network. Over time, the network became more effective at facilitating both explicit and tacit
knowledge transfers due to the creation of a variety of processes for knowledge sharing.
Thus, the network structure, motivation for member participation, and types of knowledge shared
have evolved and changed substantially over time. In the initiation phase the network structure was one
large network with the core firm (Toyota) as a hub subsidizing network activities (See Figure 6).’ There
were weak ties among network members and few members even had strong ties with the core firm.
Suppliers were motivated to participate in the supplier association primarily to demonstrate their
commitment to Toyota in hopes that Toyota would reward them with more business. The type of
knowledge exchanged was primarily explicit knowledge/information. Over time, Toyota built strong
bilateral relationships with suppliers through the one-to-one knowledge transfers and the supplier
association activities. Suppliers now participated in the network not only to demonstrate their
9 Toyota’s subsidies came in two forms: 1) financial (money for meeting rooms, social activities,
organizing and planning meetings); and 2) valuable knowledge (Toyota sends in its consultants free of
charge to participating members). It was important for Toyota to subsidize netsvork knowledge-sharing
activities early on to ensure that members realized sufficient benefits from participation.
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commitment to Toyota, but also to receive the knowledge transfers from Toyota. The knowledge
exchanged was primarily explicit knowledge in the large network (supplier association) setting but also
tacit knowledge in the bilateral-transfer (consulting) setting.
The next phase in the evolutionary process was to strengthen multi-lateral ties among members
and develop multiple “nested networks” for knowledge sharing within the larger network. This was
accomplished largely through thejishuken/PDA core group processes which strengthened multi-lateral
ties, thereby facilitating knowledge sharing among suppliers. At this stage of network evolution, the
individual supplier’s motivation for participation in network activities is knowledge acquisition and
reciprocity. Thus, network knowledge sharing processes have become self-sustaining in the sense that
suppliers willingly and actively participate without doing it simply to show loyalty to Toyota. Further,
there are multiple mechanisms for transferring both explicit and tacit knowledge, with mostly tacit
knowledge being exchanged in the nested networks and one-to-one transfers. In this mature phase of the
nework, the degree of tacit knowledge being transferred is substantial whereas it was almost non-existant
in the initiation phase (See Figure 6).
CONCLUSION
Our study suggests that Toyota’s ability to effectively create and manage knowledge sharing
processes within its production network at least partially explains the relative productivity advantages
enjoyed by Toyota and its suppliers (Lieberman et al, 1997; Dyer, 1996). Toyota has created a set of
“meso” routines which facilitate the bilateral and multi-lateral transfer of knowledge among production
network members. This explains why Toyota continues to maintain its productivity and quality
advantages long after the practices and principles of TPS have diffused throughout the auto industry. As
Toyota’s international purchasing chief, Michio Tanaka, observed, Toyota is simply better at “knowing
how to implement TPS in specific factories and contexts.” Many of these knowledge-transfer processes
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are unique to Toyota. Competitors have not yet been able to imitate the institutionalized knowledge
sharing processes that reside within the Toyota production network. Our research indicates that network-
Ievel knowledge sharing routines area critical factor in explaining why Toyota is a moving target and
why it continues to maintain productivity and quality advantages over its competitors. Our study also
suggests that the notion of a “dynamic learning capability” (Teece et al, 1997) that creates competitive
advantage may well need to be extended beyond firm boundaries.
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TABLE 1.
LIST OF TOYOTA EXECUTIVES AND SUPPLIERS INTERVIEWED
Toyota Executives Interviewed
Name Position
1. Koichiro Noguchi
2. Michio Tanaka
3. Junzo Matsumoto
4. Kenji Sato
5. Nobuhiko Suzuki
6. Keiichi Tamura
7. Tsuyoshi Kuriyamoto
8. Bart D. Heller
9. Hiroshi Kawaguchi
10. Ichiro Yamada
11. Yukihito Takemura
Gen. Mgr.-lnt. Purchasing
Gen. Mgr.-Int. Purchasing
Mgr. - Planning& Admin.
Int. Purchasing Div.
Corp. Mgr.-Purchasing
Mgr. - Cost Reduction
Int. Purchasing Div.
Asst. Mgr. - Engine, Power
Train, & Electronics
Parts & Body Purchasing
Mgr. - Metal, Interior&
Chemicals, Parts &
Body Purchasing
N. Amer. Project Group
Int. Purchasing Div.
Mgr. - Administration
Purchasing Planning
Asst. Mgr. - Planning&
Administration Group
Int. Purchasing Div.
Asst. Mgr. - Equipment
Design Dept. Body
Toyota Suppliers Interviewed
!&2!!
1. Nippondenso Co.
2. Kojima Press Co.
3. NSK Ltd.
4. Asahi Glass Co.
5. Aishin Seiki Co.
6. Araco Corporation
7. Tokai Rika Co.
8. Toyota Automatic Loom Works
9. Toyota Auto Body Co.
10, Central Motor Wheel Co.
Name
12. Suguya Fukusato
13. Takaaki Matsumoto
14. Noriyuki Yokouchi
15. Chris Nielson
16. Motoo Usui
17. Lance Lewis
18. F.E. (Gene) Tabor
19. Masami (Max) Suzuki
20. Tom Fitzgibbons
21. Hajime Ohba
22. Less Nichols
23. Cindy Kuhlman-Voss
24. Koji Kondo
25. James R. Olson
26. Kenji Miura
27. Kazunori, Hayashi,
28. Toshihiro Sugai
29. Ryoichi Hibio
30. Akihiko Morikaw~
United States
Position
Proj. Mgr. - Int. Affairs
Technical Admin. Div.
Gen. Mgr. Public Affairs
V.P. - Purchasing
Asst. Gen. Mgr. -
Purchasing Planning
Coord. - Purchasing
Mgr. - Tech Support
Purchasing Planning
Gen. Mgr. - Parts and
Components Purchasing
Coordinator - Purchasing
Asst. Project Mgr - Tech
Support - Purchasing
General Mgr., TSSC
Asst. Mgr. - Research&
Training, TSSC
Specialist - Research &
Training, TSSC
Proj. Mgr - Bus. Planning
Proj. Planning/Mgmt
V.P. - External Affairs
Manager, OMCD
Project GM, lnt. Purchasing
Gen. Mgr., Quality Control
Manager, Purchasing
Manager, Purchasing
1. Johnson Controls, Inc.
2. Continental Metal Specialty, Inc.
3. Summit Polymers, Inc.
4. Amtex
5, Aisin U.S.A. Mfg., Inc.
6, Quality Safety Systems Co.
7. Lucas Body Systems NA - Ettrick
8. Tokai Rika U.S.A., Inc.
9. Takata Inc.
10. McKechnie Vehicle Components
11. Grand Haven
TABLE 2
KEY KNOWLEDGE-SHARING PROCESSES IN THE TOYOTA NETWORK
Process Nature of the Transfer Type of Knowledge Toyota Functions Involved
Process
1. Supplier-Association Multi-lateral Explicit Knowledge (some Purchasing
tacit knowledge)
2. On-site Consulting (OMCD) Bilateral Tacit Knowledge OMCD
3. Supplier Learning Teams Multi-lateral Tacit Knowledge OMCD
(Jishuken) LAD
4. Problem Solving Teams Bilateral Tacit Knowledge QAD
OMCD
MOD
LAD
5. Employee Transfers Bilateral Tacit Knowledge Purchasing
Personnel
6. Performance feedback; Bilateral Explicit Knowledge Purchasing
Process Monitoring
Note: OMCD=Operations Management Consulting Division; MOD=Manufacturing Operations Division; QAD=Quality Assurance
Division; LAD=Logistics Administration Division. “Tacit knowledge” as referred to here refers primarily to (1) conscious tacit
knowledge, and (2) collective tacit knowledge (see Spender, 1996).
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Figure 2
Organization of Toyota’s Supplier Association
Freuuencv
Once/annum
Twice/annum
6 Times/annum
General Assembly
Top Management
Communication Meeting
Executive Meeting
3DivisionalMeeting 1
Frequency: once/month Frequency: once/month
Agenda: - Information gathering Agenda: - Information sharing
from TMC
- Training
- Plans and policies
- Know-how /best practice sharing
- Research activities
%
500
450
400
350
300
250
200
150
100
50
Supplier”
o
20
40
60
80
100
120
0/0
450
n400
Figure 3
TSSC Project Results
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Figure 4
Toyota’s Voluntary Study Group (Jkhuken)
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l Each group consists of 6-8 suppliers. Direct competitors are not in the same group.
Group composition changes every 3 years to keep groups “fresh.”
l Each group meets with Toyota to decide the theme (area of focus) for the year.
l The group visits each supplier’s plant over a 4-month period examining
the processes and offering suggestions for improvement.
l Toyota’s operations management consulting division visits weekly to
give advice and monitor progress.
l Toyota organizes an annual meeting where each group presents the key
learnings from the year’s activities.
Figure 5. Evolution of Toyota’s U.S. Supplier Network
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Figure 6. Evolution of a Knowledge-Sharing Network
Initiation Phase; Immature & Mature Phase; Effective
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d
Dimensions Key Characteristics
Network Structure: l One large network with
core firm as hub
l Bilateral relationships with core firm
l Weak ties among most members
c Numerous structural holes
Type of Knowledge: l Explicit knowledge
Member Motivation: l Demonstrate commitment to
core firm
Kev Characteristics
l Large network plus multiple
“nested networks”
l Multi-lateral relationships
l Strong/embedded ties in nested
networks and with core firm
l Few structural holes
Core Firm
( i.e. Toyota)
l Both explicit and tacit knowledge
l Acquire valuable knowledge; self sustaining
system
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